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Since the end of the Cold War, the perceived need for Navy ships has dropped, and so 
the shipbuilding budget has dropped.  Seemingly coincidental with this budgetary pressure, and 
perversely aggravating the problem, ship costs began to rise steeply.  We will set aside that 
ships have grown in weight by about three percent per year since World War II and that ever-
more weapon systems are being put into them, and confine ourselves to discussions of costs 
rising for ships beyond the increase in “content.”  We will also set aside rises due to commodity 
prices and inflation and that fewer ships, divided among a fixed industrial base, reduce the base 
for overhead and reduce opportunity for the effects of quantity-driven learning; these effects are 
well understood, and yet cost growth in ships exceeds that which they explain. This paper will 
show two additional effects, each of which causes ship direct labor to rise in a way that has 
never been adequately modeled.  The paper will demonstrate, via a statistically significant 
model, cost growth both from loss of learning due to increased time between ship starts as well 
as from the lessening of efficiency due to inexperienced labor caused by fluctuating demand. 
Introduction 
Since the end of the Cold War, the perceived need for Navy ships has dropped; 
therefore, the shipbuilding budget has dropped, as has most of the Defense Department’s 
budget.  The Global War on Terror (GWOT) has further stretched budgets.  Seemingly 
coincidental with this budgetary pressure, and perversely aggravating the problem, ship costs 
began to rise steeply.  This paper will demonstrate that a significant portion of the increase in 
ship costs is not a coincidence at all but is a direct result of decreased budgets in an 
unavoidable way.  We will set aside that ships have grown in weight by about three percent per 
year since World War II and that ever-more weapon systems are being put into them, and 
confine ourselves to discussions of costs rising for ships beyond the increase in “content.”  
Conventional wisdom holds that fewer ships, divided among a fixed industrial base, causes 
reduced base for overhead and reduced opportunity for the effects of quantity-driven learning; 
these effects are fairly well understood, and yet cost growth in ships exceeds the cost growth 
explained by conventional effects. This paper will show that two additional effects are at play, 
each of which causes individual ship direct labor to rise in a way that existing models and cost 
estimating tools do not predict.  The paper will explain these two effects and conclusively show 
their impact.   
The analysis that follows will demonstrate, via a statistically significant model, two 
effects: the effect of less demand and the effect of less-steady demand. The former causes 
stretched-out ship-class acquisitions, increasing time between ship starts; the latter causes 
workforce instability.  The analysis was conducted first on the Arleigh Burke (DDG 51) Aegis-
guided missile destroyer program and demonstrated to be statistically significant (25 data 
points).  In order to be absolutely certain of the analysis, as is the custom on important studies, 
it was conducted a second, independent time, on a wholly different ship type, the Wasp (LHD 1) 
class of amphibious assault ships (7 data points).  These ships are nearly four times as big as a 
DDG, have a different mission, and were built in the same era, but on a significantly different 
schedule.  The analysis revealed the same result and was again statistically significant.  The 
import of this second trial cannot be overstated; it results in dramatic increase in the significance 
of the results, from the customary 95% significance level to a 99.75% level.  The resultant 
model is called the Advanced Learning Model.  (The three progressively more comprehensive 
versions, ALM 1, ALM 2, and ALM 3, are summarized in this paper.) 
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Graphics would greatly simplify and clarify this summary, but the necessity of removing 
values and avoiding the compromise of proprietary data are delaying this process.  The paper 
as presented will show these very illuminating graphics.  The authors apologize for the lack of 
graphics herein and hope the reader will attend the briefing! 
ALM 1 Analysis: The DDG Class 
The analysis begins with an examination of Vessel Labor (VL), recurring direct labor, in 
manhours (MH), by ship.  The problem that presents itself, in ship class after ship class, is that 
there is a fairly obvious learning curve for the beginning of the ship class, but at some point this 
curve fails to predict future ships, and VL begins to rise seemingly without cause.  If we simply 
run a learning curve through the initial ships, and then run subsequent curves as the number of 
ships rises, we will get an answer that seems to show an ever-flattening learning curve.  (As we 
note later, some parties even claim that learning ceases at some point in a ship class; this is a 
misinterpretation of the perturbing—and, as we will show, perturbed—data.) 
This is a learning curve only in a manner of speaking, because, at some point, the 
“learning curve” does not pass through the data points in any satisfactory way.  There is no 
“learning curve” other than in the sense that any set of points can have a best-fit line run 
through them.  What is going on here? 
One of the problems is that traditional learning curve theory requires a steady work force 
building the same product multiple times with no significant interruptions or pauses.  Modern 
ship programs aren’t like that.  If these conditions are not fulfilled, there is discussion in the 
literature of loss of learning, but no closed-form, statistically-based method to predict how much 
learning is lost.  One model, the Anderlohr Break-in-Production Model, quantifies the effects of 
production breaks, but requires expert opinion and is, therefore, not defensible—it is only useful 
when mutually agreed to by, e.g., the contractor and the contracting officer.  In practice, this 
agreement is rare.  In competition, or in cases of outside scrutiny, for example by the OSD 
CAIG, this method will almost certainly not stand up. 
This problem seemed intractable, with no defensible methodology, until one graph 
changed everything; that single graph, one of many scatter plots, led to the breakthrough that 
started the ALM.  In that graph, Vessel Labor and Time between Ship Deliveries (in the final 
version, start fabrication was used as the marker for ship construction interval) were jointly 
plotted by ship (this necessitated use of a dual-axis graph).  From this one “Rosetta Stone” 
graphic, it became clear that MH rise and fall as time between ship starts rises and falls.  We 
were not yet ready to assert a closed-form learning model, but we began to suspect that 
learning was continuing throughout the ship class, and perhaps being lost as well.  The driving 
variable was ultimately expressed in terms of percent of build duration instead of days, as will 
be explained later. Many painstaking analytic steps remained, but the basic answer had begun 
to emerge. 
The analysis took a number of steps, as we have said.  It should be noted that nothing 
was easy in this analysis, since the data went back many years and, more often than not, was 
not available in the form in which it was needed.  Accordingly, practically every step required 
data normalization using analytical constructs or some form of “decoding” or deconstructing.  
These steps were all done after careful consultation with people who were present and in 
responsible positions at the time of production, and are in accord with conventional wisdom.  
Most significantly, in the end the analysis works, so the steps are, to a point, justified.  We say 
this knowing that, “the end does not justify the means”; nevertheless, when steps that make 
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sense are taken, and the result is both in accord with our ideas as to how it should be, and 
statistically verifiable, the result acts to shore up our confidence in the steps.  With that warning, 
we will proceed with the description of the analysis.  
1. First, we subtracted Type I change orders as listed in the contracts for each ship.  These 
are changes requested by the Navy for new “content” on the ship. 
2. Second, we removed change orders that were unseen originally because they were 
embedded in the base work of later ships.  These change orders were no longer tracked 
in the tracking system, as the work they contained was “rolled into” the base contract.   
3. Third, we took into account “Green Labor,” adjusting the MH to what they would have 
been had the labor mix been a nominal mix of experienced and inexperienced labor.  
This third step removes ship-by-ship variability of the labor force mix. 
4. Fourth, we adjusted for time between ship starts, as represented by the Start Fabrication 
step.  This fourth step is the keystone to the analysis.  The statistics for this step will be 
shown. 
The first three steps were difficult to judge on a one-at-a-time basis since they were not 
statistically testable.  As we have said, however, we assert that the final step, having been 
performed after the first three and tested as valid, acts to indicate (and we use this word 
advisedly) that the first three steps were valid.  Had the fourth step failed, we would not know 
which step(s) to blame, but since it worked, and since all four steps conform with conventional 
wisdom on how these effects should work, we feel justified in claiming they all were valid.  We 
did not rest on this claim, however, but conducted analysis on a second ship class and 
ascertained that our findings were neither a coincidence nor a result of “wishful analysis.” 
These steps as described result in a “peeled onion”—by “backing out” the various 
compounding effects to arrive at what turns out to be the smooth and continuous underlying 
learning curve.  It should be noted that all steps can be reversed to constitute a cost-estimation 
model that relies on accurate plans for change orders, yard manning, and ship intervals, at least 
the last two of which can be derived from shipbuilding plans. 
Analytical Details 
Analysis for Step 1—Change Orders 
Change orders were available for all ships, but only at the aggregate level.  When these 
aggregated changes were removed, it was clear further analysis was needed. We knew from 
testimony that, at a certain point in the life of any class, change orders from prior ship contracts 
are “rolled into” the base contract; from this point forward, these change orders are not tracked 
separately from the base work. This led us directly to Step 2, embedded change orders. 
Before we depart from step 1, however, we should note that actual VL MH for change 
orders are not tracked separately; so, only estimated change orders are available. There is 
considerable doubt among analysts as to the value of change orders, some believing that 
change orders are significantly overestimated (and, hence, a great source of revenue), others 
believing they are a significantly underestimated (and, hence, a loss).  When this analysis was 
done, we emerged with the conviction that change orders are estimated quite well, else the 
analysis would never have held up; we urge analysts and decision-makers to consider change 
order estimates to be more accurate than they have in the past. 
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Analysis for Step 2—Embedded Change Orders 
The removal of embedded changes required a great deal of decryption. Using the 
aggregate changes as a base, we segregated out one-time allowances for rip-out (removing 
completed or in-progress work that the change order replaces), disruption, and one-time change 
orders.  We also had to apply learning to the change orders, because like any work, as units 
progress, MH decrease.  Applying the normal percentage for each of these one-time effects, 
and applying learning, we “reverse engineered” to decode the change orders for follow-on ships.  
With the ship-by-ship deconstructed change orders in hand, we were able to “see” what 
the change orders looked like and, thus, could see when the change orders were rolled into the 
basic contract. We were able to spot a distinct rise in base work and an offsetting drop in 
change orders on the same ship; we matched this detective work with the memories of senior 
shipyard personnel and with the contractual picture (changes in the base work could only 
happen at the start of a contract of multiple ships).  The resulting embedded change orders 
were then subtracted from the appropriate ships; total changes were now removed.   
Analysis for Step 3—Green Labor 
“Green Labor” is defined as workers with less than 5 years experience; after 5 years, 
Green Labor becomes “Dry” or “Seasoned” Labor.  Green Labor is less effective than Seasoned 
Labor, based upon a study conducted at Northrop Grumman Ship Systems at their Ingalls 
Operations, and as indicated by a percentage.  (For example, if a worker is 80% effective, then 
it will take him or her 25% more hours to complete a task, since 1.0/0.8 = 1.25.)  This old study 
was not much in use, because it was perceived to be less than defensible since it was based 
upon expert (inside-yard) opinion.  One of the benefits of our analysis was that we revitalized 
this model and gave it credibility, as we will discuss.  The percentages by year probably differ 
with type of ship, yard, training programs, etc., as we know that the percentages are different at 
Northrop Grumman Newport News, based upon a study conducted there.  For this analysis, we 
used a weighted average of effectiveness for workers in the first 5 years. 
As in earlier steps, however, it wasn’t just that easy.  Data did not exist, for any unit, 
tracking the portion of the labor force that was green vs. the portion of the labor force that was 
dry.  Again, we needed a construct.  By interviewing managers and HR personnel, we 
ascertained the key variables in the experience-level problem, and built a Markov Chain model 
for labor experience.  We know, for example, that layoffs were LIFO (last-in-first-out); we know 
the attrition rates for Seasoned and Green labor, and we know that most hired labor was Green.  
We built a Markov Chain model, and it produced the then-current labor mix within about 2 
percentage points; the model was seeded with a reasonable start point, so we were confident 
that the Markov Chain labor mix estimates were close.  This model gave us the year-by-year 
labor mix, and we used this mix to adjust to a notional (most common) labor mix, thereby nearly 
(because this is an approximation, we can only say “nearly”) eliminating the effects of labor 
force mix. 
As a side note, in past briefings we often said that the effects of labor mix are not 
dominant in this problem, because labor mix is fairly stable; after Hurricane Katrina, however, 
when we looked at reconstituting the labor force with this model, we saw that when labor swings 
considerably, the effect becomes quite big.  In a small-business-base case, considerable cost 
impact is, in fact, caused by labor swings.  While average Green Labor is less efficient than 
Seasoned Labor, first-year labor is quite a bit less efficient, so an unstable work force that is 
constantly ramping up and down will result in considerable loss of efficiency.  This all said, 
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however, our model demonstrates that the potential for cost impacts are greatest in the last 
variable: loss of learning due to interval effect.   
Analysis for Step 4—Loss of Learning due to Interval Effect 
The final step is the most important step, both because the prior steps were either 
understood or in practice, and because this step acts to verify, in the way we have described, 
the earlier steps.  In this step, we conducted a linear regression of the difference between 
learning as observed and learning as expected.  Though this was difficult in derivation, and had 
many false steps, the result is intuitive. 
Two major assumptions underlie our method.  These two assumptions are in accord with 
current learning curve theory but deserve mention.  First, we assumed that learning is constant 
and incremental and proceeds from one ship to the next.  This means that as other effects 
occur, the learning curve factor is still at play.  We have been surprised that others have 
asserted that learning stops after nine or ten ships1.  This is not in consonance with anything in 
the literature of learning, and we believe that the results of this analysis bear out our belief that 
learning continues through all units.  Getting ahead of ourselves for a moment, we believe that 
at some point in a ship class there is surely a considerable change-order effect and the 
attendant slow-down in production as the changes are engineered, which causes loss of 
learning.  This is not to say learning stopped, but rather to say that other effects are causing a 
rise in ship costs.  Some of these effects are controllable; and all are, to some degree, 
predictable.  Second, we believe that should there be a loss of learning, (1) the learning begins 
anew, arguably at the same rate; and (2) it continues from the new point with later ships.  Both 
things occurred in the two classes we analyzed.  Said another way, loss of learning acts as a 
reset of the curve; later units will never revert to the old curve, but rather proceed from the reset 
unit following a new curve with the old slope.  This last belief means that we must measure loss 
of learning from the effective unit of the prior ship, moved ahead one unit.  Thus, we must 
correct out all other effects since those effects (or at least those we encountered) are either 
transient or fade on their own timescale.  Green labor appears to be one such effect; as the 
labor force matures, workers approach a basic efficiency. 
This discussion should by now have alerted the reader as to how complex this analysis 
is and how dependent it is on each step.  Get one step wrong—we know, we did it many times 
as we groped through it—and the whole thing will not work.  One can “see” the effects; to prove 
them analytically, however, requires considerable precision and care.  It was particularly 
confounding that for many of the ships in the DDG class, the Green Labor and interval effects 
tended to counteract each other.  This was because when time between ships stretched out—
causing loss of learning due to interval effect, which tended to drive VL MH up—there was less 
work in the yard, so manning was reduced (largely via the firing of Green Labor), resulting in a 
more efficient labor force, which tended to drive VL MH down.  At other times, such as at the 
onset of major changes in a class, the effects can reinforce each other because there has been 
a gap, but work then suddenly builds up in the yard.  It was not until both effects were quantified 
that this complex interaction could be fully understood.  This interplay has doubtless been a 
major complication in understanding these effects. 
                                                
1 Arena, M.V., Blickstein, I., Younossi, O., Grammich., C.A. (2006). Why has the cost of Navy ships risen?  
A macroscopic examination of the trends in US Naval ship costs over the past several decades. RAND.  
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When conducting our analysis, we first determined to what point on the learning curve 
each ship should have progressed based on the previous ship.  This was conducted iteratively 
from the second ship to the final ship.  We then regressed the difference between the 
expectation and the realization, expressed as numbers of units (or fractions thereof) lost, 
against days between ships.  The regression was significant at the 95% significance level (the 
“p-value” was 0.0106).  The coefficient of determination (called r2) was 0.4324.  While this is not 
an overwhelming r2, it is a respectable one, and in any event, the determinant of validity is 
significance, not r2.   
This regression shows that loss of learning is linear with days between ship starts.  As 
ships are built less and less frequently, learning seems to “flatten.”  The underlying learning 
curve slope, however, continues to remain in force.  The ships do not cease to learn, they lose 
learning.  This is an important distinction.  If the interval shortens, as it occasionally does, the 
MH drop faster, reverting to the original learning curve slope if they are close enough together.   
There is much to discuss about this finding, but first we should observe one very 
important fact.  The underlying learning that emerged for a ship class of 25 ships was the same 
learning realized by the first nine undisturbed ships.  After the ninth ship, cost began to rise, so 
much so that the cost of the thirteenth ship was nearly equal to the cost of the fourth ship.   This 
may not be surprising after all our descriptions of the effects that change costs.  The point is that 
most of these effects do not happen in the early ships because they tend to be produced at 
steady, close, intervals; this proved true for both DDGs and LHDs.   The rise that began in 
DDGs after nine ships (and in LHDs after four ships, though, like DDG, about five years into the 
program) was caused by the combined effects of change orders, embedded change orders, 
labor inefficiencies caused by the coincidence of a new class of large ship in the shipyard, and 
loss of learning due to the delays caused by the incorporation of a major change (DDG 51 Flight 
IIA).  We are confident that this is why so many analysts in shipbuilding cite cessation of 
learning; but we wish to say this again for emphasis: learning continued in this ship class, as far 
as we had data, out past the 25th ship.  The reader will see that this was true in LHDs as well.  
Costs rose due to predictable (or at least expected) effects, and, though learning was lost due to 
slowdowns, it continued on from each point “as regular as sunrise.”  To say learning stopped is 
to miss the point and to forsake the opportunity of prediction.  
We also found that there appeared to be an “ideal” interval between ships that causes 
consistent learning.  But as our understanding deepened, we began to appreciate that a ship 
class can seem to take any learning curve, depending on the predominant interval between 
ships.  We will also show the days between ships was a poor way to display the interval, and we 
later changed to percent of construction duration; this change promises to open a whole new 
possibility.  We will we discuss both things further below. 
The Need for Confirmation: The LHD Class 
The DDG model has been laid out.  In many important analyses, it is customary to do 
second trials (e.g., in medical studies).  The second test guards against spurious results.  We 
will describe the meta-analysis later.  In this case, though, a confirming analysis was needed 
more than in usual cost analysis cases because of the many data normalization steps that 
preceded the regression.  We have asserted that the ultimate regression sustains the earlier 
steps, but we cannot escape being nervous that we may have driven towards a conclusion, 
inadvertently forcing the conclusion.  This is natural and must be guarded against.  Accordingly, 
we immediately set about repeating the analysis for a second ship class.  
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We did exactly the same analytical steps on the LHD as described for the DDG and 
arrived at exactly the same conclusions; we found the LHD class had done just what the DDGs 
did.   The LHD step 4 regression for the Interval Effect was significant at the 95% significance 
level (the “p-value” was 0.017).  The coefficient of determination (called r2) was 0.887.  This r2 
was higher, due simply to the fact that the LHDs fell into two groups; 3 units lost no learning and 
two lost all learning. Once again, the determinant of validity is significance, not r2.   The only 
difference was that the rate at which the LHDs lost learning was slower (the slope of the line 
was flatter); and the “cross-over” point, the interval at which there was no loss of learning at all, 
was longer in days (the x-intercept was greater).  In a manner of speaking, the “time constants” 
were longer.  What was more interesting, however, was that LHDs had on two occasions lost 
learning very dramatically; the class had reverted to a first unit (lost all learning) twice, at LHD 5 
and LHD 7.  The underlying learning for the LHD class was quite similar to the DDGs, only a few 
percentage points flatter.  As a last caution, we know that two LHDs lost all learning and 
reverted to the first unit.  We, thus, cannot know whether the interval effect might be stronger 
than we have evidence for because these two ships were capped at the first-unit level.  
Accordingly, we know that the LHD interval effect is at least as strong as we found, and quite 
likely stronger.   
This brings us to an important point: learning due to interval, according to our model, 
occurs in units with time. For mature classes (say after nine ships, like the DDG), the loss of a 
few units is not a large number of MH, because the curve has flattened out by this point to a few 
percentage points per unit.  For less mature classes, like the LHD, however, learning is still 
occurring at a steep rate, and the loss of a unit may be more on the order of 10% or more.  In 
either case, if the Navy or the Coast Guard have negotiated an FPI contract, because “follow 
ship costs should be well known,” and there is a delay due to negotiations, design activity, or 
lessened SCN budgets, the rise can erase all profit.  This can be even more of a problem if the 
method of EAC computation does not catch an insidious rise in preceding ships, perhaps also 
due to factors that do not lie at the feet of the builder and which will cause the next ship to rise 
for additional (additive) reasons. 
Meta-analysis and Mutual Confirmation 
To summarize, the DDG model is, as far as statistics can take us, valid.  The LHD model 
is also valid, and we can use either.  The significance of the entire analysis is one minus the 
square of the significance of each: 1 - 0.052 = 1 - 0.0025 (significance is 99.75%.)  This well-
known technique is called meta-analysis.  Most importantly though, the LHD model represents a 
second ship class and was undertaken to confirm the DDG model.  Taken together, the LHD 
and DDG models are much stronger than either is alone because the models are mutually 
confirming.  Taken alone, the DDG analysis has the weaknesses that “first models” commonly 
have: although reasonable, the adjustments were taken to drive towards a smooth learning 
curve.  Statistically, this amounts to an uncredited loss of “degrees of freedom.”  Alternatively, a 
hostile view can arise that the data was “cooked.”  The LHD model alleviates this concern.  
Since the steps taken with DDG were replicated in LHD and the same result was obtained, our 
analysis was neither dumb luck nor manipulation.  Further, the LHD class had only 7 ships 
completed, so taken alone, the LHD analysis lacks data across the full spectrum of interval 
length.  The DDG model alleviates this concern with 25 ships and a wide range of intervals. 
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ALM 2: The Enterprise Model 
We built an enterprise-level model that instantiates the Advanced Learning Model for an 
entire shipyard complex, namely Northrop Grumman Ship Systems.  We call this a forward-
looking model because it projects effects given the results of the prior analysis, which we call 
ALM 1.  This model, called ALM 2, brought about three significant new capabilities.  First, the 
model allows for the quick determination of the impacts of the effects described above on either 
a future ship class or the remainder of a class.  It also allows the input of all ships in the 
enterprise.  Second, it computes the labor profile, at the gross level, for the yard—a capability 
which formerly took weeks.  The detailed trade-by-trade labor profiles are still done by hand, 
and much mischief can arise at the trade level that the enterprise model is blind to; but, large 
what-ifs can nevertheless be done quickly as a first-order approximation.  Third, this enterprise 
model has the ability to model cross-ship effects and, since it is in closed form, feedback effects 
on labor. 
When a ship cost estimate is done, the apparent labor needs are determined for a 
notional labor profile—the profile that was in effect at the time of the historical data.  The model 
first needs to compute the efficiency of the labor force in the yard where it is being built based 
on the mix of Green Labor.  The model then will compute interval effects based on the 
preceding ship and the interval before the ship in question.  At this point, the model will adjust 
the need for labor.  This adjustment changes the labor mix in the yard because new labor must 
be hired above (or below) what was expected, due to the effects of these two variables.  This 
produces a feedback loop which happily converges fairly quickly.  Likewise, the model, having 
all ships in the yard loaded in, quickly computes the effects of the new labor on all the other 
ships in the yard as the labor force, and the associated feedback loops, swells or shrinks and 
does so quickly. 
The enterprise model brought out an understanding that is worthy of some discussion.  
As we began to use the model to predict ships, we needed to develop a good prediction for 
change orders.  When we did the analysis using the carefully deconstructed change order data 
for these two ship classes, we were taken aback by the size and the implications of what we 
found.  We found that change orders were large on the first ship, which we had known, and 
averaged 12.30% of base costs (with a wide variability). We knew that by definition change 
orders would be large at Flight change or at major modifications, so when we found that 
changes were 8.62% of cost it was sobering but not surprising.  What surprised us was that 
change orders on the rest of the ships, ships that were neither first ships nor major 
modifications, was 2.97%, with a fairly clear pattern of rising over the class but virtually always 
exceeding 1.2%.  This change-order pattern meant that by the 25th ship, with two major 
modifications, the labor cost of the DDG change orders had have become equal to about half 
that of the base ship.  On the LHD, change orders have risen to be about one-quarter of the 
cost of the base work by the 7th ship.  This finding showed us that change orders are a much 
larger part of the cost of follow ships than we had realized, even though we knew the 
conventional wisdom that changes are a big factor in ship costs.   
It should not be concluded that change orders are inherently bad.  Change orders are at 
least partly a response to lessons learned, changes in technology and in the threat.  That said, 
they bear careful monitoring due to their size, which begins to rival initial cost in their claim on 
scarce SCN. Change orders also have a second, hitherto-less-well-understood effect on ship 
costs.  It is quite likely that change orders act both as chicken and egg in the ship-cost scenario.  
As budgets drop, interval increases, allowing an ever-increasing pressure for change—be it due 
to an industrious engineering community, technology changes, or requirements changes.  
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Conversely, changes cause design delay, increasing intervals, sometimes considerably, as they 
do in major modifications. Thus, changes are already a considerable factor and have the ability 
to become more of a factor in tight budget years, as well as to drive the other effects to become 
larger as they delay ships and contribute to cost rises—which destabilize labor costs. 
Implications 
At the outset of this paper, we described how ship costs have suddenly seemed to go 
out of control just as budgets have dropped, exacerbating the problem.  There are no doubt 
many reasons for such a problem, some of which are outlined in the RAND study already 
referenced.  Many of the reasons cited in the RAND paper, such as inflation and commodity 
volatility, have conventional means of prediction, however flawed the results may be.  Our 
paper, on the other hand, puts forward three new effects that were hitherto generally ignored 
analytically or discounted by decision-makers.  As we have already said, change-order 
estimates in general turned out to be quite accurate; without this accuracy, the analysis would 
have been impossible.  The “lost” change orders are unarguable in principle, and although the 
exact values estimated could be quibbled with, they are certainly “generally right.”  The 
illumination we have brought to this issue will help explain past cost increases. And closer 
attention to tracking change orders going forward should be a big help to future cost estimation. 
The Green Labor model we described was in use at one Northrop Grumman shipyard and is 
now in use at them all, although its impact is debated and occasionally somewhat discounted.  
We believe that Green Labor’s part in this analysis will go far to bolster the basis for the 
computation of this effect.  The interval effect has always been part of shipyard lore, but has 
never been quantified.  Even now, shipyards are struggling to understand the model and to 
overcome past “explanations” for rising costs, such as: labor inefficiencies (true, but overstated 
for the lack of an agreed-upon model), one-time events (again, true, but arguably overstated for 
lack of sufficiently reliable discrete cost tracking), and disruption effects such as were alleged to 
have happened twice on DDG and once on LHD (we found no significant differences that 
needed explanation, so the supposed disruption, although appealing intellectually, was absent if 
you believe our analysis).   
The net of the effects in this paper is extremely large, and almost all was cost growth.  
The newly explained cost growth in labor, resulting from embedded change orders, Green Labor 
and loss of learning due to interval for all ships from 12 through 25 of the DDG is a total of 21%, 
and for all ships from 3 through 7 of the LHD is a total of 19%.    This is a staggering amount of 
cost to have been hitherto unexplained.  Of the newly explained cost growth in labor, 8.8% 
(almost half) of the growth in DDGs was from loss of learning due to the interval effect; for the 
LHD class, 14% (almost ¾) was from loss of learning due to the interval effect. Most of the rest 
of the unexplained cost growth was due to “lost” change orders.  The DDG interval effect was 
less of the total partly because the class was more mature and further down the learning curve; 
thus, units lost were smaller in MH than for LHDs. Conversely, for LHDs, change orders were 
less of the total because there had been fewer units for them to have accumulated.  Green labor 
was the least of the effects, and tended to be pluses or minuses as labor waxed and waned.  
We thus believe that a large mystery has been solved, and that we have provided the ability to 
avoid similar large errors in the future.  As with any cost-estimating technique, of course, the 
ability to project will depend upon how well we can determine the inputs. 
This model has the capability to account for many large and unpleasant cost-growth 
effects, especially for modified ships that are characterized by long intervals, large change-order 
packages, and large swings in labor as the class goes back into production.  Hence, we believe 
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that the model will be invaluable in better predicting costs.   We hope it will be helpful in 
reducing mistrust and tension between the Navy and the Coast Guard on the one hand, and the 
shipyards on the other—as well as between the Congress and the services.  We believe the 
model goes a long way towards explaining cost rises in terms the various parties can better 
understand as unavoidable in the past and more predictable in the future. 
There are policy implications to these findings as well.  We believe costs can be better 
estimated now; but beyond that, they can be better controlled as well.  One simple exercise 
involved changing the acquisition profile for Large Deck Amphibious ships.  By optimizing the 
timing of ship acquisitions, we found that labor costs could be reduced by almost 6% in constant 
dollars—and this was with only a single ship class to work with.  In addition, in order to be 
successful, the Navy’s current cost reduction strategy of re-using existing hull forms for new 
classes of ships must obey the constraints illuminated here.  Change orders must be 
suppressed to the degree that they can, intervals between ships must be thoughtfully timed, and 
demand variance that results in workforce instability must be avoided.   We note that this is 
consistent with an enterprise view of shipbuilding: the Navy making acquisition decisions that 
support its private-industry partners in their efforts to contain costs.  On the other hand, for the 
Navy to pursue acquisition strategies that ignore the demonstrated effects of change orders, 
loss of learning due to interval, and Green Labor—and at the same time to press for cost 
reduction—is inherently problematic.  It is further setting the enterprise up for failure. 
Next Steps 
We hope to take this analysis to other ship classes.  We further hope to take it beyond 
ships to other commodities.  As strange as it may sound, application to satellites is quite 
promising, as they are, like ships, complex objects with long development spans involving 
integration of many components, operated in demanding environments, and procured in small 
“batches” (usually one or two).  There is no clear reason why this methodology should not work 
for other sorts of production.  Indeed, the problem may be considerably easier since labor force 
changes should be less of an effect in items of shorter duration and higher production rate.  
Change orders may also be easier, because data will not be so old in calendar terms and since 
the shorter times lend themselves to fewer changes.   
We would like to point out that so-called “rate effects” in learning have been elusive.  We 
know of no demonstration of a statistically significant rate effect.  We suggest that perhaps the 
“rate effect,” which is commonly introduced as a second term in the learning equation, may 
simply be an incorrect portrayal of the interval effect we have demonstrated.  Rate effect uses 
the number of units to be produced in a given year and lowers costs as the quantity rises and 
raises costs as it drops.  This acts to reduce cost when units are built closer together (more 
production units per unit time), thus mirroring the sense of the interval effect we found but using 
different mathematical expressions to model it.  Statistics have the unfortunate limitation that a 
hypothesis must be formulated for the test.  If the hypothesis is structured in an incorrect form, 
the model is unlikely to be significant; thus, the hypothesis that the model is invalid cannot be 
rejected.  Many good ideas founder on this shoal, and this failure of an “almost right model” or a 
model that acts in a sensible way, but is formulated a bit incorrectly, frustrates the analyst and 
leads to unreasonable distrust of statistics.  We look forward to investigating the rate effect 
relative to the interval effect and believe that the interval effect will replace it in practice. 
As we have alluded to, we have already begun a re-formulation of the model.  We have 
changed the expression of the model for loss of learning from days to percent of construction 
duration.  This is merely a change in scale, and the results do not change for either model.  
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What does change, however, is that when the model is expressed in the new way, we discover 
that the LHD and DDG graphs of loss of learning overlay each other.  In the “days form,” we had 
no way to move to another class, because we had no way to interpolate save linearly, and we 
were wary of this assumption.  Worse yet, when applied to a much smaller ship, like a frigate, or 
a much larger ship, like an aircraft carrier, the extrapolation became irrational.  This amounted 
to reductio ad absurdum of linear extrapolation and so cast doubt upon interpolation.  When 
expressed as percent of interval, however, the result, although not yet tested, is appealing and 
intuitive.  This version of the model is called ALM 3.   
We are not shipbuilders, and further, we are always reluctant to speculate beyond what 
we can prove.  Nonetheless, one of the reasons we are inclined to believe this “percent form” is 
that the nature of work on a large ship changes less quickly during production than for small 
ships.  For example, shell plating and other large-object welding lasts a similar percentage of 
construction time on large ships as it does for smaller ships; hence, we speculate that the 
opportunity to “learn” lasts longer, and time to lose it takes longer in days but not in percent. 
This change in scale has taken us to another point.  We are in the midst of trying to 
determine whether the percent model will lead us to a long-sought capability: the capability to 
predict the underlying learning curve for any ship knowing only the expected construction 
duration and the planned schedule for the class.  We anticipate having a preliminary version of 
this in time for the symposium, or to have learned that this is un-doable.  If we can achieve this, 
we feel the results will be every bit as important as the loss-of-learning model.  It would also 
increase the importance of both accurate schedule estimating and stable program schedules, as 
these are key inputs to the learning-curve determination, which in turn is the single biggest 
driver of labor cost.  It is premature to make a claim of broader application, especially since the 
ship portion is as yet undone, but we cannot stop our minds from racing ahead.  We hold out 
hope for this model being useful in other commodities.  We have, on an informal basis, noted 
that the interval for Global Hawk is similar to that for DDGs in percent, and that the learning 
curve is similar.  We raise this point in order to excite the reader’s interest and to indicate that 
the possibility of further application is real.      
Conclusions 
This paper is short, and so our conclusions should be short as well.  We have shown 
that a careful treatment of change orders, labor force mix, and time between ship starts has 
enabled us to demonstrate—we believe for the first time—a closed-form and statistically 
rigorous treatment of loss of learning.  The analysis has validated an old labor mix model and 
shown it to have considerably credibility, and has unified change orders, labor profiles, and loss 
of learning in a way that substantially changes ship-cost estimation.  We have already created 
an enterprise model and have hopes of being able to extend the model to other commodities. 
We will, perhaps, even be able to predict learning curves for ship classes—a capability that 
does not yet exist. 
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